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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal concerns an order transferring a juvenile 
for prosecution as an adult.  We hold that such a transfer order 
is subject to pretrial appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine, and we reject the juvenile's argument that the 
transferring court committed various procedural errors, including 
the admission of hearsay in violation of due process and Virgin 
Islands law.  We therefore affirm the decision of the Appellate 
Division of the District Court, which sustained the transfer. 
 
 I.  
 In November 1991, a juvenile delinquency complaint was 
filed against A.M., who was then 16 years old.  The complaint 
alleged that, on the previous day, A.M. had engaged in conduct 
that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the 
felonies of first-degree rape, first-degree unlawful sexual 
contact, first-degree assault, conspiracy, and kidnapping for 
rape.  In early December 1991, the Government of the Virgin 
Islands filed a motion requesting that A.M. be transferred for 
prosecution as an adult.  After a hearing in May 1992, the Family 
Division of the Territorial Court issued an order granting that 
  
motion.  In October 1992, the Appellate Division of the District 
Court affirmed that order, and A.M. then took this appeal to our 
court. 
 
 II. 
 Before addressing A.M.'s arguments, we will first 
explain why we have jurisdiction to entertain his appeal.  Under 
28 U.S.C. § 12911 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c),2 we have jurisdiction 
over all "final decisions" of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, including "all final decisions of the district court on 
appeal from the courts established by local law," 48 U.S.C. § 
1613a(c).  Although the Appellate Division order from which this 
appeal was taken is not a "final order" in the ordinary sense, 
four other courts of appeals have held that district court orders 
transferring juveniles for prosecution as adults under the 
federal transfer statute, 18 U.S.C. § 5023, fall within the 
                     
1
.  28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides in pertinent part: 
 
  The courts of appeals (other than the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States . . . 
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
except where a direct review may be had in 
the Supreme Court. 
2
.  48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) provides in pertinent part: 
 
  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the 
district court on appeal from the courts 
established by local law. 
  
collateral order doctrine and are therefore appealable before 
trial.  In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Smith, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 414 (1991); United States v. A.W.J., 804 F.2d 492 (8th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 
1984).  Cf. Guam v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981) (holding, based on different 
reasoning, that transfer order under Guam statute is subject to 
pretrial appeal).  These four courts of appeals have reasoned 
that such orders represent the district court's final decision on 
the transfer question, that this question is separate from the 
merits of the prosecution, and that the denial of appellate 
review until after the juvenile has been tried as an adult would 
cause the irreparable loss of some of the statutory protections 
offered to juvenile offenders, such as protection from  
disclosure of court records.  For essentially the reasons 
explained in these decisions, we are persuaded that the Appellate 
Division's order in this case falls within the collateral order 
doctrine and is thus appealable. 
 We likewise hold that the Appellate Division of the 
District Court had jurisdiction to hear A.M.'s appeal from the 
decision of the Family Division of the Territorial Court.  Under 
48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a), the District Court currently has "such 
appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the Virgin Islands 
established by local law," and V.I. Code Ann. Tit. 5, § 2508(d) 
specifically provides that a juvenile transfer order of the 
Family Division is a "final appealable order."  Moreover, the 
  
general appellate jurisdiction of the District Court extends at 
least to review of "final" decisions of the Territorial Court,3 
and the Territorial Court's transfer order in this case was, as 
previously discussed, "final" within the meaning of the 
collateral order doctrine. 
 While we thus hold that transfer orders such as the one 
at issue in this case are subject to two levels of appellate 
review, we must express our concern about the potential for delay 
that such appeals may produce.  In the future, we believe that 
appeals of transfer orders should be treated much like appeals of 
detention orders.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).  The parties should 
alert the Appellate Division and our court to the nature of the 
appeal and request expedited disposition.  The parties should 
then be required to comply with short briefing deadlines; 
extensions should be granted only in extreme situations; and such 
cases should be given priority on the docket.   
 
                     
3
.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33, provides that the district court 
has appellate jurisdiction to review the "judgments and orders" 
of the territorial court in all juvenile and domestic relations 
cases, as well as in "all civil cases" and "all criminal cases in 
which the defendant has been convicted, other than on a plea of 
guilty."  The District Court of the Virgin Islands has 
interpreted this reference to "judgments and orders" as meaning 
"final judgments and orders."  Creque v. Roebuck, 16 V.I. 225, 
227 (D.V.I. 1979) (emphasis in original).  See also, e.g., 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. deJongh, D.C. Civ. App. No. 
92-214, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9402 (1993); Archer v. Aero Virgin 
Islands Corp., D.C. Civ. App. No. 92-18 (D.V.I. Sept. 28, 1992).  
Assuming for the sake of argument that V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 
33, contains this limitation, we nevertheless hold, for the 
reasons explained in text, that the Territorial Court's order was 
appealable. 
  
 III.  
 Turning to the merits of this appeal, we first address 
A.M.'s argument that the Family Division judge did not properly 
consider the likelihood of his rehabilitation if he was found to 
have committed the alleged offenses.  Under the transfer 
provision applicable here, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2508(a), the 
Family Division "may" transfer a juvenile for adult prosecution 
if the juvenile was at least 16 years old at the time of the 
alleged offense, and the alleged offense would constitute a 
felony if committed by an adult.  While this provision commits 
the transfer decision to the sound discretion of the Family 
Division,4 another provision, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(d), 
provides that evidence of seven specified factors "shall be 
considered in determining transfer."  These factors are: 
  (1)  the seriousness of the alleged 
offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community requires waiver; 
 
  (2)  whether the alleged offense was 
committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner; 
 
  (3)  whether the alleged offense was 
against property, greater weight being given 
to offenses against persons, especially if 
personal injury resulted; 
 
  (4)  whether there is probable cause to 
believe that the offense charged has been 
committed and that the child has committed 
it; 
                     
4
.  Cf. United States v. G.T.W., 992 F.2d 198, 199 (8th Cir. 
1993) (federal transfer statute); United States v. Romulus, 949 
F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1690 
(1992); United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). 
  
 
  (5)  the sophistication and maturity of 
the child as determined by consideration of 
his home, emotional attitude and pattern of 
living; 
 
  (6)  the record and previous history of 
the juvenile, including previous contacts 
with the Youth Services Administration, law 
enforcement agencies and courts, and prior 
periods of probation or prior commitments to 
residential institutions; 
 
  (7)  the prospects for adequate 
protection of the public and the likelihood 
of reasonable rehabilitation of the child, if 
found to have committed the alleged offenses. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 In deciding that A.M. should be transferred, the Family 
Division judge specifically discussed all of these factors, 
including the factor of rehabilitation.  In her oral findings, 
she noted that the only witness who testified concerning 
rehabilitation was a social worker from the Virgin Islands 
Department of Human Services named Vaughn A. Walwyn and that 
Walwyn had testified without contradiction that there were no 
programs for juvenile sexual offenders in the Virgin Islands.  
App. 123.  The judge thus concluded that there was "nothing 
available" or at least "nothing that [had] come to the Court's 
attention" that created "a likelihood of reasonable 
rehabilitation" for A.M. if he was treated as a juvenile and was 
found to have committed the offenses charged.  Id. 
 The Family Division judge again addressed the question 
of rehabilitation in her written transfer order.  There, she made 
the following finding: 
  
  That the testimony elicited at the 
hearing disclosed that there is no program of 
rehabilitation in the Virgin Islands for 
minors who are found delinquent of the crime 
with which the minor is charged. 
 
App. 20. 
 In attacking the decision of the Family Division, A.M. 
suggests that the court erred because it did not consider whether 
he could be rehabilitated if sent to a juvenile facility outside 
the Virgin Islands.  See Appellant's Br. at 13, 17-18.  We 
disagree with this argument.  The Virgin Islands transfer statute 
required the Family Division to consider evidence concerning "the 
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation" of A.M. if he was found 
to have committed the alleged offense, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 
2509(d)(7).  This language does not expressly require that the 
court survey the availability of suitable rehabilitation 
facilities in other jurisdictions, and we see no reason to 
suppose that the Virgin Islands Legislature intended to impose 
any such inflexible requirement.  If A.M.'s attorney was aware of 
specific, suitable facilities outside the Virgin Islands, she 
could have called them to the judge's attention.  In that event, 
the Family Division judge could have considered whether sending 
A.M. to any of these facilities represented a "reasonable 
rehabilitation" plan under all of the circumstances, including 
the cost to the Government of the Virgin Islands.  It does not 
appear, however, that A.M.'s attorney identified any particular 
facility outside the Virgin Islands, and we consequently do not 
believe that the judge erred in limiting her consideration to the 
  
facilities and programs that had "come to the Court's attention."  
App. 123.    
 In a related argument, A.M. seems to suggest that the 
Family Division should not have considered his likelihood of 
rehabilitation in light of the juvenile facilities that the 
Government of the Virgin Islands has chosen to create but should 
have instead considered his likelihood of rehabilitation in light 
of the juvenile facilities that he believes the Government should 
have created.  We disagree with this argument as well.  It seems 
most unlikely that the Legislature of the Virgin Islands, when it 
provided in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(d)(7), that the Family 
Division must consider a juvenile's "likelihood of reasonable 
rehabilitation," meant to require or authorize the Family 
Division to decide whether the Legislature had provided for the 
creation of adequate juvenile facilities.  Rather, we believe 
that the Legislature meant to require the Family Division to 
consider the likelihood of a juvenile's rehabilitation in light 
of the facilities and programs then available.  Here, the Family 
Division judge carried out that responsibility. 
 
 IV. 
 A.M. next argues that the juvenile delinquency 
complaint did not comply with the requirements of V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 5, § 2510(a), which provides that such "[c]omplaints shall 
be verified and may be signed by any person who has knowledge of 
the facts alleged."  In this case, the complainant, Detective 
Merlin Wade, did not personally sign either the complaint or the 
  
verification.  Instead, both are signed by another person "for M. 
Wade."  App. 32, 33.   
 We do not reach the question whether this mode of 
signing or verification satisfied the statutory requirements 
because we do not believe that the formal correctness of the 
complaint is an issue that is properly before us in this appeal.  
The sole question that we may consider at this time under the 
collateral order doctrine concerns A.M.'s transfer for 
prosecution as an adult under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2508(b).  
The factors that must be considered in such a transfer decision 
are carefully set out in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(d), and 
the formal correctness of the juvenile delinquency complaint is 
not among them.  If A.M. is ultimately tried and convicted as an 
adult, and if his argument concerning the form of the juvenile 
delinquency complaint is not mooted by the filing of a new 
complaint or information, he will be able to obtain appellate 
consideration of his argument at that time.   
 
 V. 
 A.M. next argues that the transfer decision should be 
overturned because the so-called "transfer summary" prepared by 
the Virgin Islands Department of Human Services recounted a 
statement that the previously mentioned social worker, Vaughn A. 
Walwyn, elicited from him in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, 
§ 2512.  While we agree with A.M. that this statement was not 
admissible against him, we hold that A.M. was not entitled to the 
relief he sought in the Family Division, namely, the striking of 
  
the entire "transfer summary" submitted by the Department of 
Human Services and/or the denial of transfer. 
 Prior to a transfer hearing, the Virgin Islands Police 
Department and the Department of Human Services must submit 
written reports to the court concerning the factors that the 
court is required to consider.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 
2509(e).5  The police report must address the first four factors 
listed in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(d), all of which relate 
to the offense or offenses charged, and the Department of Human 
Services report must address the remaining three factors, all of 
which concern the juvenile's character, background, and history.  
Such reports or "transfer summaries" were submitted in this case. 
 The summary submitted by the police department set out 
the version of the events disclosed by its investigation.  
According to this account, a young woman named D.B., then 16 
years old, was sitting in a classroom in her high school at 
approximately 11:15 a.m. when A.M. and an adult, Jacob Mark, 
entered the room.  A.M. and Mark fondled D.B. "while she tried to 
evade them and repeatedly told them to stop."  App. 86.  A.M. and 
Mark then dragged her into a smaller room and barricaded the 
door, and A.M. raped D.B. while Mark held her down.  Id. 
 The summary submitted by the Department of Human 
Services properly contained sections discussing A.M.'s "social 
                     
5
.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(e), refers to the Youth 
Services Administration, rather than the Department of Human 
Services.  Under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 3, § 437, however, this is 
deemed to be a reference to the Department of Human Services. 
  
history," family, and previous referrals and court convictions.  
However, the summary also contained several paragraphs setting 
out the version of the incident in question that had allegedly 
been provided by A.M. to Walwyn.  According to this version, 
after A.M. and Mark entered the classroom, A.M. conversed with 
D.B., eventually asked her to have sexual intercourse, and 
secured her consent.  She then followed him into an adjacent 
room, and they engaged in consensual intercourse while Mark 
guarded the door from the inside.  When they later left the room, 
D.B.'s friends asked her what had happened, and she broke out in 
tears.  A.M. allegedly speculated that D.B. had concocted the 
rape allegation because of fear of her parents' reaction if they 
learned what she had done.  App. 92. 
 Under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2512, a juvenile's 
statements to law enforcement officers, the Attorney General, or 
employees of the Department of Human Services are inadmissible 
against the juvenile unless, among other things, "a parent or 
guardian who does not have an adverse position, a friendly adult, 
or the child's attorney was present at the interrogation when 
[the] statement was given."  These requirements were apparently 
not met when A.M. made his statement to Walwyn. 
 Based on this failure to comply with the requirements 
set out in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2512, A.M.'s attorney filed a 
motion to strike the entire transfer summary submitted by the 
Department of Human Services, and she argued in a supporting 
memorandum that without this summary A.M. could not be 
transferred.  See App. 46-50.  In response, the government argued 
  
that the transfer summary should not be stricken and that at most 
"the appropriate remedy" would be for the court to strike 
Walwyn's account of A.M.'s statements.  Id. at 58.  A.M.'s 
attorney, however, submitted a reply insisting that the entire 
Department of Human Services' transfer summary be stricken.6  Id. 
at 78.  See also id. at 67.  Later, at the conclusion of the 
transfer hearing, when A.M.'s attorney again argued that his 
statement had been improperly obtained and that "the whole 
transfer summary should be stricken," the Family Division judge 
replied:  "The whole transfer summary should be stricken? . . .  
Even though [it's] authorized by the statute?"  Transfer Hearing 
Tr. at 186-87.  The court subsequently asked:  "[W]hat does all 
that have to do with my determination . . . on whether to 
transfer or not?"  Id. at 188.  When A.M.'s attorney continued to 
insist that the summary be stricken, the judge stated: 
 All right.  Well, the transfer summary is 
authorized by the statute.  If you are going 
to move it to be stricken, when [it's] 
mandated by the statute . . .  then I'm not 
going to strike it. 
 
Id. 
                     
6
.  A.M.'s attorney contended that it would be insufficient to 
strike only the portion of the summary recounting A.M.'s 
statement to Walwyn, as the government had suggested, because 
A.M.'s statement had also influenced the section of the summary 
labelled "Impressions and Evaluation," which contained an 
observation by Walwyn that A.M. had not shown remorse.  Id. at 
67.  A.M.'s attorney then argued that if this section of the 
summary were also stricken, the summary would not comply with  
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2509(d) and (e) (see App. at 67), and 
that consequently the entire summary would have to be stricken, 
and transfer would have to be denied.  Id. at 78. 
  
 Based on the written submissions of A.M.'s counsel and 
the colloquy summarized above, it appears to us that the only 
relief that A.M.'s counsel sought from the Family Division was 
the striking of the entire summary submitted by the Department of 
Human Services or the denial of the transfer motion.  These 
requests were overly broad and were therefore properly denied.  
While A.M.'s counsel would have been entitled under V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 5, § 2512, to have her client's statement stricken from 
the record, she never requested that narrower relief. 
 Moreover, we see no indication whatsoever that the 
Family Division judge considered A.M.'s statement or any evidence 
derived from that statement in making her transfer decision.  The 
judge made no reference to the statement or any evidence derived 
from it in her oral findings or her written order.  In addition, 
the judge repeatedly suggested, as we believe the previously 
quoted excerpts from the record demonstrate, that she saw no 
connection between the improper questioning of A.M. and the 
transfer determination.  Her view was summarized by her 
statement:  "[W]hat does all that have to do with my 
determination as on whether to transfer or not?"  Id. at 188.  
Furthermore, since A.M.'s statement, as recounted in the transfer 
summary, was entirely exculpatory, it carried little potential 
for prejudice.7   For these reasons, we hold that the erroneous 
                     
7
.  The dissent argues that A.M. might have been prejudiced 
because his statement led Walwyn to observe that A.M. had not 
shown remorse.  As we interpret the record, however, A.M.'s 
attorney never specifically asked the Family Division judge to 
strike or disregard this statement (as opposed to striking the 
entire transfer summary of the Department of Human Services), 
  
inclusion of A.M.'s statement in the Department of Human Services 
transfer summary does not require reversal of the transfer 
decision.  
 
 VI. 
 A.M.'s last argument is that the Family Division judge 
erred in permitting Detective Wade, during his testimony at the 
transfer hearing, to relate the accounts of the incident that 
were given by the alleged rape victim and by other witnesses.   
A.M. argues that hearsay is not admissible to establish probable 
cause at a transfer hearing. 
 A.M. seems to suggest that the admission of hearsay in 
this context violates the Due Process or Confrontation8 Clauses 
(..continued) 
(see footnote 6, supra), and we are reluctant to overturn a 
decision of the Family Division for failing to do something that 
that court might well have done if A.M.'s attorney had only made 
the request.  Moreover, A.M.'s brief on appeal does not even 
mention Walwyn's statement about A.M.'s lack of remorse, and this 
brief adheres to the all-or-nothing position that "[t]here was no 
way to rectify the wrong other than to exclude the entire 
transfer summary."  Appellant's Br. at 24.  Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that the Family Division judge 
relied on Walwyn's observation about A.M.'s lack of remorse and, 
in any event, that observation does not seem particularly 
prejudicial.  Unless it is assumed that A.M. actually committed 
the offenses charged, one would not expect him to be especially 
remorseful or sympathetic toward D.B., who had caused his arrest.  
Thus, because we see no basis for concluding that the Family 
Division judge assumed that A.M. was guilty, we do not think that 
Walwyn's observation was particularly prejudicial. 
8
.  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies only 
to "criminal prosecutions," and juvenile proceedings have not 
been held to be criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., Middendorf v. 
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1976); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 
U.S. 528, 541 (1971) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 553 
(Brennan, J., concurring); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967); 
Sadler v. Sullivan, 748 F.2d 820, 824 n.12 (3d Cir. 1984).  It 
  
as made applicable to the Virgin Islands by 48 U.S.C. § 1561.  He 
relies on Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966), in 
which the Supreme Court held that procedures at a juvenile 
transfer hearing must "measure up to the essentials of due 
process and fair treatment."  The Kent Court added, however, that 
it did not mean that the hearing must conform with "all of the 
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual 
administrative hearing," id.  Following Kent, many courts have 
held that the Constitution permits use of hearsay at such 
hearings.  See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d at 1255 (5th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 930 (D. Or. 
1979); People v. Taylor, 391 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. 1979); Clemons 
v. State, 317 N.E.2d 859, 863-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661, 664 
(Iowa 1990); Hazell v. Maryland, 277 A.2d 639, 644 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Watson, 447 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (Mass. 
1983); Matter of Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Minn. 
1980); G.R.L. v. State, 581 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1979); In re Harbert, 538 P.2d 1212, 1217 (Wash. 1975); State v. 
Piche, 442 P.2d 632, 635 (Wash. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 969 
(1968), and cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).  Cf. O.M. v. 
State, 595 So.2d 514, 516 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), cert. quashed, 
595 So.2d 528 (Ala. 1992) (hearsay admissible in juvenile 
(..continued) 
thus appears that the constitutionality of admitting hearsay in 
this case should be judged under principles of due process.  See 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 
562 (1966). 
  
transfer hearing except when it violates rights of cross-
examination or confrontation).  We agree with the weight of this 
authority. 
 It is settled that the Constitution permits the use of 
hearsay to show probable cause in a number of contexts.  For 
example, it is constitutional to rely on hearsay to establish 
probable cause for an arrest.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 173 (1974); United States v. Ventresca, 
380 U.S.102, 107-08 (1965); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 173-74 (1949).  The Constitution also permits a grand jury 
to rely on hearsay in finding that there is probable cause to 
believe that a defendant committed a criminal offense.  Costello 
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956).  Likewise, Rule 
5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
"[t]he finding of probable cause [at a preliminary examination] 
may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part," and we 
assume that this provision is constitutional.   
 A probable cause determination under Fed. R. Cr. P. 
5.1(a) is closely analogous to the probable cause determination 
made by the Family Division in this case, i.e., that there was 
probable cause to believe that A.M. committed the offenses with 
which he was charged.  To be sure, Rule 5.1(a) applies to 
proceedings against adult defendants, whereas transfer 
proceedings involve juveniles, but we are not aware of any 
decision of the Supreme Court or of this court holding that the 
Constitution imposes stricter evidentiary standards in juvenile 
than in adult proceedings.  On the contrary, the Supreme Court 
  
has stated that juvenile proceedings need not be conducted in 
conformity with all of the formal procedural requirements 
applicable in criminal trials.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; 
Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.  Consequently, we are convinced that the 
admission of hearsay to establish probable cause in a juvenile 
transfer proceeding is constitutionally permissible. 
 Contrary to A.M.'s argument, we also believe that 
Virgin Islands law permits the admission of hearsay in this 
context.  We have not found any Virgin Islands statute or court 
rule that addresses this specific question.  However, Rule 7 of 
the Rules of the Territorial Court provides that "[t]he practice 
and procedure in the territorial court shall conform as nearly as 
may be to that in the district court in like causes, except where 
there is an express provision in the law or these rules to the 
contrary."  We therefore examine whether hearsay would be 
admissible in a juvenile transfer proceeding in district court.   
 Rule 1101(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides 
that these rules apply to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, as well as to the federal district courts.  Subsections 
(b) and (e) of Rule 1101 then list certain proceedings in which 
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in whole or in part, and 
subsection (d) lists certain proceedings in which the rules do 
not apply, except with respect to privileges.  Unfortunately, 
neither juvenile proceedings in general nor juvenile transfer 
proceedings in particular are listed in any of these 
subdivisions.  Moreover, while subsection (b) states that the 
rules apply generally to all "civil actions and proceedings" and 
  
to all "criminal cases and proceedings," juvenile transfer 
proceedings do not fall neatly into either of these categories.  
Even a proceeding on the merits of a juvenile delinquency charge 
cannot easily be categorized as either "civil" or "criminal."  
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at  541 (Opinion of 
Blackmun, J.).  More importantly, the proceeding at issue here -- 
a transfer hearing -- is of a preliminary nature and is 
consequently not comparable to a civil or criminal trial. 
 For this reason, the only federal courts that have 
considered the question have held that the provision of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that most closely applies to transfer 
proceedings is Rule 1101(d)(3), which states that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (except with respect to privileges) do not 
apply to preliminary examinations in criminal cases.  See United 
States v. Doe, 871 F.2d at 1255 & n.2; United States v. E.K., 471 
F. Supp. at 930.  We agree with this analysis, and we therefore 
conclude that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is 
admissible to establish probable cause in juvenile transfer 
hearings.  By virtue of Rule 7 of the Rules of the Territorial 
Court, it follows that hearsay was admissible for this purpose in 
A.M.'s case. 
 
  VII. 
 For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the 
Appellate Division of the District Court. 
  
 
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS IN THE  
INTEREST OF: A.M., A MINOR, No. 93-7736 
 
STAPLETON, J., Concurring and Dissenting: 
 
 I join all of the opinion of the court except Section 
V.  Because I believe social worker Walwyn's interrogation of 
A.M. about the alleged crime in the absence of, and without 
notice to, his attorney violated A.M.'s constitutional right to 
counsel as well as his rights under 5 V.I.C. § 2512, I 
respectfully dissent from the court's disposition of this appeal.  
I would remand for further proceedings on the government's motion 
to transfer A.M. for trial as an adult.     
 Walwyn interviewed A.M. about the alleged offense when 
Walwyn knew that A.M. was represented by an attorney.  Walwyn's 
report to the Territorial Court was based primarily on that 
interview.  In his report, Walwyn, after reciting A.M.'s version 
of what happened on the day of the alleged offense, drew the 
following inferences: 
 [A.M.] seems to be complacent and laid back 
about the entire affair.  Initially, the 
young man did not fully understand the extent 
of the charges against him.  Although he was 
later made aware of the extent of the 
charges, his attitude did not change.  
Additionally, he shows little remorse for 
what the alleged victim might be 
experiencing.  He indicated that it is her 
fault that things are hard on her because she 
could have easily told the truth.  
 
  
 A.M. filed a "Motion to Strike" that asked the 
Territorial Court to suppress not only A.M.'s version of the 
offense as reported in Walwyn's report but also the evaluation 
and recommendation sections of that report.  The motion and 
associated briefs requested that these latter segments of the 
report be suppressed because "both sections refer to the minor's 
alleged lack of remorse."  App. 67.  As A.M.'s brief explained to 
the court, 
 Had the minor's attorney been present at the 
interview or had the minor heeded the 
attorney's [prior] instructions [not to 
discuss the case with anyone], no facts would 
have been elicited for the caseworker to 
presume that the minor should be displaying 
feelings of remorse (i.e. the minor's view of 
the incident). 
 
App. 67. 
 
 The Territorial Court declined to suppress any portion 
of Walwyn's report.  After a hearing, it granted the government's 
motion to transfer A.M. for trial as an adult.  Although the 
court's findings do not specifically refer to A.M.'s attitude 
toward the alleged offense, the court relied on Walwyn's report 
and hearing testimony as a basis for concluding that a denial of 
the government's motion would provide no prospect for 
rehabilitation of A.M. and would afford inadequate protection for 
the public. 
 Under the Virgin Islands statute, as under the statute 
before the Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 
(1966), a proceeding on a motion to transfer a juvenile for trial 
as an adult is a "critically important" proceeding.  Id. at 560.  
  
As a result, based on the teachings of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967), I conclude that the Due Process Clause entitled A.M. to 
have his attorney present when he was interrogated by the state 
concerning the alleged offense.9  Since the record provides no 
basis for finding that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of this right by A.M., I can only conclude that Walwyn's 
questioning of A.M. without his attorney being present was 
unconstitutional.  As the majority acknowledges, it also violated 
5 V.I.C. § 2512. 
 Unlike my colleagues, I am unable to conclude that the 
failure to grant the motion to suppress was harmless error or 
that A.M.'s counsel, by asking too much relief, precluded A.M. 
from thereafter maintaining that less than the entire report 
should have been suppressed.  It is clear from Walwyn's report 
and testimony that his conclusion concerning A.M.'s attitude 
toward the alleged offense was based on his interrogation of A.M. 
regarding the events of the day in question.  That conclusion was 
thus fruit of a poisoned tree.  Further, while it is conceivable 
to me that the Territorial Court gave no weight to Walwyn's 
conclusion regarding A.M.'s attitude, I consider that highly 
                     
9
.  Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 makes the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution applicable 
in the Virgin Islands.  A.M.'s Motion to Strike claims a right to 
counsel and cites the Sixth Amendment in support.  It may be that 
the Sixth Amendment, being limited to criminal proceedings, is 
not applicable to a juvenile transfer proceeding.  If it is not, 
however, I believe there is a right to counsel at that stage 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  A.M.'s 
motion made clear to the Territorial Court that he claimed a 
constitutional right to counsel, and I would hold that this was  
sufficient to preserve the issue. 
  
unlikely and am unwilling to assume an absence of reliance in the 
absence of express assurance from the Territorial Court.  When 
asked to determine whether an individual accused or convicted of 
a crime can be rehabilitated or whether such an individual 
represents a threat to the public, courts normally and 
understandably rely on the available information regarding the 
individual's attitude towards the events in question and I 
believe it very likely that the Territorial Court did so here. 
 My colleagues correctly point out that A.M.'s counsel 
sought suppression of Walwyn's entire report.  However, to the 
extent A.M.'s motion was based on the contention that Walwyn's 
interrogation violated A.M.'s right to counsel, the briefing made 
clear that A.M.'s concern was about the above-quoted conclusion 
that Walwyn reached concerning A.M.'s state of mind. 
 I would reverse the order of the Territorial Court and 
remand for further proceedings.  If the Territorial Court is able 
to provide explicit assurance that Walwyn's evaluation of A.M.'s 
attitude played no role in its decision on transfer, I would 
permit the entry of a new transfer order.  If the court is unable 
to give that assurance, a new study and report by another social 
worker would be necessary to provide an untainted basis for a new 
hearing on the government's motion to transfer. 
